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V 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Cross-Appellant Ada County, Ada County Board of Commissioners ("Ada 
County"), terminated the employment of Appellant, Cross-Respondent Richard T. Wright ("Wright") 
on January 15, 2013. (R. 146.) On February 12, 2013, Wright filed his initial Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial in this matter. (R. 13-20.) On July 2, 2013, Wright filed an Amended Complaint 
alleging that Wright was terminated in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
(the "Whistleblower Act" or the "Act") and in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
(R. 53-55, Counts I-II.) The Amended Complaint also alleged claims for "Negligent and/or 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." (R. 55-56, Count III.) 
On October 14, 2014, Ada County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all four of 
Wright's claims. (R. 70-197.) The issues raised by Ada County were almost entirely questions of 
law. (See R. 164-168; 171-179; 186-189; 190-192; 193.) On January 5, 2015, the District Court 
granted Ada County's Motion for Summary in its entirety. (R.299-311.) Therefore on January 16, 
2015, Ada County filed is Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees requesting attorney's fees 
under the Whistleblower Act and under Idaho Code § 12-117 for the emotional distress claims 
because Wright's claims Jacked a reasonable basis in Jaw or fact. (R. 316-322.) Regarding attorney's 
fees under the Whistleblower Act, Ada County requested its full amount of the fees incurred for that 
claim, or in the alternative, a partial award commencing from the time it filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on a unique provision in Idaho Code§ 6-2107 that allows a employee to 
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avoid an award of attorney's fees when it voluntarily dismisses a claim after determining that the 
employer would not be liable for damages. (R. 322.) 
Also on January 16, 20 I 5, Wright filed his Motion for Reconsideration on all of his claims. 
(R. 368.) On February 17, 2015, the District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In 
affirming its previous grant of summary judgment, the District Court determined that the allegations 
forming the basis of Wright's Whistleblower Act Claim did not fall within the scope of the 
Whistleblower Act because the scope was "necessarily and logically limited" by the codified 
legislative intent of Whistleblower Act. (R. 443-444.) In sum, the District Court determined that 
Wright did not have a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act because the Act only authorizes 
a cause of action related to governmental waste or the governmental entity's violations of a law, rule 
or regulation. (Id. citing to LC. § 6-2101.) Wright's claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress was dismissed based on the dismissal of the Whistleblower Act, which Wright relied on to 
create a duty owed to Wright under the negligence claim. (R.308-310. 444.) Wright's FMLA claim 
was dismissed because the undisputed facts showed that the reason for Wright's termination was 
unrelated to the provisions of the FMLA. (R. 307-308, 444.) Finally, Wright's claim for Intentional 
Infliction for Emotional was unsupported by the evidence. (R. 309, 444.) 
On February 17, 2015, the District Court also entered its Memorandum and Order Costs 
summarily denying Ada County's request for attorney's fees but without discussing the specific 
provisions available under Idaho Code § 6-2107 justifying at least a partial grant of attorney's fees 
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on the Whistleblower Act claim. (R. 450-452.) Wright timely filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 455-459) 
and Ada County timely filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal (R. 460-462). 
Since the grant of summary of judgment on each of Wright's claims was based primarily on 
questions of law, the material facts applicable to the issues on appeal are minimal and can be stated 
concisely. The material facts necessary to the Whistleblower Act claim are simply that Wright's 
Amended Complaint alleged that his termination was in retaliation for his role in the initiations of 
investigations into two different Ada County employees. (R. 5 I, 54.) At most, these investigations 
were initiated based on allegations of general harassment in violation of an Ada County personnel 
policy. (R. 203; R. sealed, ADA 105, 123, 1028.) This personnel policy was approved by Ada 
County as a part of its employee handbook that was only adopted by resolution by the County. (R. 
159-160, 231-232.) Thus, the policy that formed the basis of the Whistleblower Claims did not 
constitute a law, rule or regulation within the meaning of the Act. 
Regarding the FMLA claim, the undisputed facts showed Wright submitted an application 
for FMLA leave prior his termination. (R. 153.) However, the required certification from his health 
care provider was not received by Ada County prior to Wright's termination. (R. 149.) The 
undisputed facts show that at the time Ada County Board of Commissioners terminated Wright's 
employment with the County, they were unaware that Wright had a pending application for FMLA 
leave. (R. 92, 113-114, 133-134, 136, 140.) The Certification specified a period of intermittent 
FMLA leave from December 20, 2012 through February 20, 2013. (R. 150-151.) Ada County 
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extended Wright's salary and benefits to cover the requested period of the leave. (R. 148.) 
The issues before the Court on appeal are almost exclusively questions of law. Thus, there 
are no other facts or circumstances that are material to questions before the court on appeal. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. The District Court abused its discretion in failing to award Ada County its attorney's 
fees under Idaho Code §§ 6-2107 and 12-117 because the District Court failed to act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards to the particular choices presented by Idaho Code § 6-2107. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Ada County is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 
6-2107 and 12-117. Ada County is a "political subdivision" within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 12-
1 17; Idaho Code § 12-117 applies to the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Di stress claim. 
Additionally, Ada County was Wright's employer within the meaning of Idaho Code § 6-2107, 
which applies to the Whistleblower Act claim. 
Under Idaho Code § 12-117 an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is mandatory 
when the opposing party has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Similarly, the 
Whistleblower Act specifically allows that "attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an 
employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is without 
basis in law or in fact." J.C. § 6-2107. In the current case on appeal, Wright has advanced both his 
Whistleblower Act claim and his Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim without a 
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reasonable basis in law and fact. Both of these claims were dependent on the finding that Wright had 
a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act (see Section IV.C below). 
These claims were dismissed on summary judgment by the District Court because the acts 
alleged by Wright did not fall within the expressly stated scope of the Whistleblower Act. In his 
Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary for Judgment, in his Motion for 
Reconsideration, and now on appeal, Wright has advanced an interpretation of the provisions of the 
Whistleblower Act that is directly contrary to the clearly-established standards for statutory 
interpretation and the express language of the statute. 
This Court has repeatedly determined that when a party advances arguments that disregard 
the plain language of a statute that party has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Arnold 
v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 345 P.3d 1008, 1013-1014 (Idaho 2015); Jayo Development, Inc. 
v. Ada County Bd. of Equalization, 345 P.3d 207,213 (Idaho 2015)(citing to Idaho Wool Growers 
Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716, 724, 302 P.3d 341, 349 (2012); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 
Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005)). Furthermore, an award is appropriate when the party 
has continued to advance the same baseless argument on appeal, yet only "us[es] the same arguments 
that were unpersuasive below and remain[] unpersuasive on appeal.'' Arnold, 345 P.3d at 1014. Also, 
the fact that an issue is a matter of first impression does not bar an award of attorney fees. Id. 
Here, in brief, the plain language of Idaho Code § 6-2101 states that the Whistleblower Act 
is intended "to protect the integrity of the government" and to that end creates "a legal cause of 
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action for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of 
reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation." (emphasis added). In disregard to this 
language, Wright contends that one protected activity in the Whistleblower Act should be construed 
to exceed this expressly stated scope of the Act and authorize a cause of action for employees who 
experience adverse action from their employees for participating in an investigation into any matter, 
regardless of whether the subject matter of the investigation implicates waste or violations of a law, 
rule or regulation or even the integrity of the government. Thus, Wright's argument lacks a 
reasonable basis in law and fact. Here, Wright's argument on appeal is the same as it was below, that 
Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) of the Whistleblower Act should be interpreted in direct disregard to the 
plain language of the codified legislative intent of the Whistleblower Act in Idaho Code § 6-210 I. 
Wright further attempts to dismiss the express provisions of Idaho Code § 6-2101 by mis-
characterizing it as legislative history. On appeal, Wright's argument only strays further from the 
plain language of the statute by refusing to acknowledge the well-established standards of statutory 
construction that require a provision of a statute to give effect to the express legislative intent. 
Furthermore, attorney's fees are warranted on appeal under Idaho Code § 6-2107, which 
contains a specific provision that allows an employee to avoid liability for the employer's attorney's 
fees "if, after exercising reasonable and diligent efforts after filing a suit, the employee files a 
voluntary dismissal concerning the employer, within a reasonable time after determining that the 
employer would not be liable for damages." J.C.§ 6-2107. Thus, the Whistleblower Act emphasizes 
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that an employer should be awarded attorney's fees for having to defend against a futile 
Whistleblower Act claim when the employee reasonably should have known the claim's futility. 
Here, Wright has persisted with his argument on appeal despite extensive briefing on this 
issue and two decisions by the District Court dismissing the Whistleblower Act Claim. Moreover, 
Wright could have walked away from the whistleblower claim after the District Court's denial of his 
Motion for Reconsideration; however, Wright chose to file an appeal to advance the same argument 
that is contrary to plain language of the statute. Accordingly, Ada County should be awarded its 
attorney's fees for having to continue to defend against Wright's futile Whistleblower Act Claim. 
In all, Wright's appellate argument continues to advance an argument that disregards the 
plain language of the statute, is an unreasonable interpretation of the Whistleblower Act, and is 
directly contrary to the standards of basic statutory interpretation. Therefore, Ada County should be 
awarded its attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending against Wright's Whistle blower Act 
and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, which lack a reasonable basis in law and fact. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review on Judicial Review. 
When reviewing an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, the standard of review 
is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955 (2004). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment initially bears the burden of establishing 
both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991). This burden may be 
met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required 
to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an 
absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's 
own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that proof of 
a particular element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711,712,8 P.3d 1254, 
1255 (Ct. App.2000). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the burden shifts 
to the nonmoving party to produce admissible evidence, which sets forth specific facts showing the 
existence of a genuine issue of fact on the elements challenged by the moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(e); 
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720-21, 791 P.2d 1285,1299-1300 (1990). An opposing 
party may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings nor may the opposing party's case 
rest on speculation. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769,820 P.2d at 364. The party opposing the motion must 
produce evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to show that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen, 117 Idaho at 720, 791 P.2d at 1299. 
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B. The District Court properly granted summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act 
claim because Wright's actions did not fall within the protections of the Act. 
The District Court properly affirmed its grant of summary judgment dismissing Wright's 
cause of the action under the Whistleblower Act because the allegations that form the basis for 
Wright's claim do not fall within the scope of the Act. The issues below and on appeal are almost 
exclusively matters of law regarding the scope of the Whistle blower Act. The crux of the issues on 
appeal is whether the specific, codified legislative intent of the Whistleblower Act (Idaho Code § 
6-2101) applies to the whole of the Whistleblower Act or whether Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2), which 
protects an employee's participation in an investigation, should be interpreted in isolation to allow 
for causes of action that far exceed those specified in the intent of the Act. 
On an initial note, Wright's Footnote I incorrectly asserts that the Court must find that 
Wright participated in the three different investigations that he asserts form the basis of his protected 
activity under the Whistleblower Act. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 14.) This assertion is 
fundamentally incorrect. Whether Wright participated any of these investigations is not required for 
the Court to rule on the operative question of law regarding the scope of the Whistleblower Act. 
Such factual findings were not necessary to the decision of the District Court and are not necessary 
on appeal. The only material fact for the issues on appeal is that each investigation at issue was 
initiated based on a potential violation of an internal personnel policy on general harassment; this 
fact is not in dispute. Answering questions regarding Wright's alleged participation in these 
investigations is simply immaterial to answering the questions of law at issue. 
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1. The Whistleblower Act created a specific cause of action targeted at a particular 
type of wrongdoing, as stated by the legislative intent. 
The primary question before the Court is whether participation in an investigation into a 
general personnel policy violation falls within the protections of the Whistleblower Act, despite the 
fact that the Act only authorizes a cause of action for adverse employment actions that result from 
a report of waste or a violation of a law, rule or regulation. Contrary to Wright's contention that one 
protected activity should be interpreted in disregard to the express legislative intent, the well-
established rules of statutory interpretation require that the provisions of Whistleblower Act be 
interpreted as a whole to give effect to the legislative intent codified at Idaho Code § 6-2101. 
The Whistleblower Act, Idaho Code§§ 6-2101 et seq., provides "a legal cause of action for 
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste 
and violations of a law, rule or regulation." I. C.§ 6-2101. Thus, the Legislature created a specific 
statutory cause of action to address a specific kind of wrongdoing. Accordingly, this Court has found 
that "[i]mplicit in the Whistleblower Act is the requirement that the employer engage in some sort 
of predicate act -which could include ordering an employee to do something illegal, or engaging in 
illicit activities itself -that triggers the applicability of the Act in the first place." Black v. Idaho State 
Police, 155 Idaho 570, 314 P.3d 625,629 (2013 ). 
Hence, not all adverse employment actions by a government employer that an employee 
claims are wrongful will trigger the protections of the Act. Id; Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,620, 
84 P.3d 551,557 (2004). Rather, the government's wrongful act must relate to waste or the violation 
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of a law, rule or regulation, as stated in the codified legislative intent in Idaho Code§ 6-2101. That 
is the explicit basis for any cause of action brought as a whistleblower claim under the Act. 
Wright's argument on appeal is essentially that this foundation does not apply to the 
protected activity described in subsection 2 of Idaho Code§ 6-2104, and that particular provision 
of the Whistleblower Act should be given an independent interpretation beyond the expressly stated 
basis for the cause of action. Wright's interpretation would create causes of action that do not relate 
to any predicate act of the government and eviscerate this Court's stated principle that such a 
predicate act is required to trigger the protections of the Act. Such interpretation is outside the scope 
of the cause of action that was created by the Legislature to protect the integrity of the government 
by protecting employees who report the government's waste or violation of a law, rule or regulation. 
Thus, the heart of the issue is the scope of the Whistleblower Act and the range of activities 
that it protects. The scope of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation. Hayes v. City of 
Plummer, Docket No. 42125, 2015 Opinion No. 98, p. 4 (Sept. 30, 2015 Idaho). As stated: 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to "derive the intent of the legislative body 
that adopted the act." Statutory interpretation "begins with the literal language of the 
statute" and "provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document." Words should be given their "plain, usual, and 
ordinary meanings" and only if the language is "ambiguous" may this court "consider 
rules of statutory construction." 
Id. (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009)). 
Undeniably, the principle of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent. Id.; 
George W Watkins Fmnily v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387 (l 990). 
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Therefore, "[l]anguage of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of 
applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the legislature's intent." Lockhart 
v. Dep't of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992) (internal quotation 
omitted). Thus, the legislative intent is like the umbrella that overarches the rest of the provisions 
in a legislative act. The other provisions will be interpreted within the shelter of that umbrella. 
Notably, Wright's incomplete recitations of the rules of statutory construction omit any reference 
to legislative intent. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 16, 19.) 
Wright contends that "Idaho Code§ 6-2104 is the Legislative proclamation of this State's 
public policy as it relates to whistleblower protections for public employees." (Id. at 13.) However, 
this blatantly ignores that Idaho Code§ 6-2101 of the Whistleblower Act is entitled "Legislative 
Intent." Idaho Code § 6-2101 is straightforward and specific. It states "that it is beneficial to the 
citizens of this state to protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for 
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste 
and violations of a law, rule or regulation." Hence, Idaho Code§ 6-2101 explicitly states the intent 
and purpose in creating protections for public employees. 
Thus, the Court does not need to look further than Idaho Code§ 6-2101 to determine the 
legislative intent of the Whistleblower Act. However, Wright consistently seems to misconstrue 
Idaho Code §6-2101 as a statement of purpose rather than as the codified legislative intent. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-18, 20.) A statement of purpose is part of the legislative history 
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of a bill and not part the of statute itself. See Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Medical Center v. Gooding 
County, Docket No. 42243, Term 2015 Opinion No. 86, p. 9 (Sept. 4, 2015 Idaho). Thus, there is a 
material distinction between the statement of purpose that is part of the legislative history, and 
legislative intent that has been codified as a statute. See Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, 
LLC v. Eastern Idaho Public Health Dist., 147 Idaho 668, 672, 214 P.3d 654,658 (Ct. App. 2009) 
("[W]e need look no further than the legislature's express intent that health districts not be 
considered as state agencies. However, a review of the legislative history of this section further 
supports this conclusion."). 
Ada County, in the proceeding below or on appeal, has not made any argument drawing from 
the legislative history or statement of purpose of the Whistleblower Act. The District Court also did 
not rely on legislative history. Rather, the sole focus has always been on the statutory language of 
the Whistleblower Act and its express, codified legislative intent authorizing a cause of action 
stemming from a report of waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation. 
The standards of statutory interpretation dictate that the provisions of the Whistleblower Act 
be interpreted in the context of this legislative intent. Hayes, 2015 Opinion No. 98 at 4. These 
provisions necessarily include the protected activities described in Idaho Code § 6-2104. 
Significantly, Idaho Code § 6-2104 is entitled "Reporting of Governmental Waste or Violation of 
Law -Employer Action." It provides in relevant part: 
(1) ( a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the 
employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in 
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good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a 
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of 
this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such 
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer 
reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation. 
(b) For purposes of subsection ( 1 )(a) of this section, an employee communicates in 
good faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is 
lacking where the employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report 
is malicious, false or frivolous. 
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because an 
employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court 
proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative review. 
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the 
employee has objected to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee 
reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation adopted under the authority 
of the laws of this state, political subdivision of this state or the United States. 
Wright contends that subsection 2 ofldaho Code§ 6-2104 should be read and interpreted 
independently of the legislative intent because otherwise the legislative intent would override the 
provisions of the statute and "rewrite the entire statute." (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 17.) He 
asserts that putting Idaho Code§ 6-2104 in context of the legislative intent would eliminate the need 
for any subsection except for subsection 1 and that "communication" of the existence of waste would 
accomplish the purpose of the statute and make other provisions meaningless. No such result exists. 
Rather, subsections l, 2, and 3 each use a different verb to describe an employee's protected 
activity and recognize that a "report" of waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation can be 
accomplished by: communicating a report of waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation (Idaho 
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Code§ 6-2104(1)); participating or giving information in an investigation into a report of waste or 
violations of a law, rule or regulation (Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2)); or refusing to carry out a directive 
that violates a law, rule or regulation (Idaho Code § 6-2104(3) ). Thus, interpreting these provisions 
in harmony with the legislative intent, and indeed the title of the section, does not create any conflict 
or render any provision meaningless. Each of the provisions are easily interpreted under the umbrella 
of the legislative intent in Idaho Code § 6-2101. 
Ultimately, Wright's argument for a far-reaching interpretation ofldaho Code§ 6-2104(2) 
extends the Whistleblower Act beyond predicate acts related to waste or violations of laws, rules or 
regulations. Wright recognizes that his interpretation of the statute would drastically expand an 
employee's protections for his participation in any investigation of any kind related to the workplace 
regardless of any government conduct. However, this argument only stands if the provision is read 
in isolation from the rest of the Whistleblower Act and contrary to the confines of the legislative 
intent. Thus, the argument must be rejected as directly contrary to the well-established principles of 
statutory construction that require provisions of a statute to be construed together to give effect to 
the legislative intent. Hayes, 2015 Opinion No. 98 at 4: Lockhart, 121 Idaho at 897,828 P.2d atl 302. 
In all, applying the standards of statutory interpretation, the Whistleblower Act as a whole, 
and all the provisions contained therein, must be given the effect of the express legislative intent. 
Idaho Code § 6-2101 is uncomplicated and unambiguously authorizes a specific cause of action 
under the Whistleblower Act for employment actions that ultimately stem from a report of waste or 
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violations of a law, rule or regulation by the government entity. This is the scope of the 
Whistleblower Act, and the activities protected by the Act must necessarily fall within that scope. 
Thus, the Whistleblower Act does not authorize a cause of action for any other basis than the 
employee blowing the whistle on a government entity's wrongful conduct involving the existence 
of waste or implicating a violation of a law, rule or regulation. The Whistleblower Act must be 
interpreted to embody the fact that the legislature explicitly created a specific cause of action to 
target a specific type of wrongdoing and nothing more. 
Wright appears to acknowledge that his limitless interpretation ofidaho Code§ 6-2104(2) 
would extend the protections of the Whistleblower Act to the minutia of the everyday workplace, 
such as an investigation into one employee parking in another's parking space. (Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 22.) Such an interpretation would lead to absurd results and an unreasonable interpretation 
of the statute, which is also contrary to the tenets of statutory interpretation. 
In defense, Wright contends that it is not absurd to interpret the Whistleblower Act as 
creating a cause of action for an employee who experienced an adverse employment action because 
he participated in an investigation into someone parking in someone else's parking space. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 22.) Wright asserts that the purpose in creating liability for a 
government employer in that circumstance is to ensure that the employee will give full and truthful 
answers to his employer. (Id.) However, the interest that the Whistleblower Act protects is not the 
interest of the employee; it is the interest of "the citizens of this state to protect the integrity of 
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government. I.C.§6-2101; see also Black, 155 Idaho 570, 314 P.3d at 629 (recognizing the "policy 
behind the Whistleblower Act [is] to protect the integrity of government"). 
Quite simply, the integrity of government is not implicated by inter-employee conflicts over 
parking spaces. Although perhaps the harmony of the workplace maybe strengthened by any 
employer investigating and resolving such workplace disputes, such disputes do not impugn the 
integrity of the government or jeopardize the interests of the citizens of the state of Idaho. 
Accordingly, such disputes fall outside the scope of the Whistle blower Act, which creates a specific 
cause of action for activities resulting from a report of waste or a violation of a law, rule or 
regulation. Thus, Wright's interpretation of the Whistleblower Act is simply unreasonable. 
Wright contends that a statute will be permissibly interpreted with an absurd result when the 
statute is unambiguous. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 23-24 ( citing to Verksa v. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg'! Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,896,265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011).) Wright contends that Idaho 
Code§ 6-2104(2) is unambiguous when read in isolation. However, the Verska court noted that an 
unambiguous statute only has one reasonable interpretation. 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P.3d at 509. 
Wright's interpretation is not reasonable when read in context of the explicit legislative intent and 
its specific purpose to protect the integrity of the government. Thus, the reasonable interpretation of 
the statute is to interpret it within the scope of the legislative intent to authorize a cause of action 
targeting government waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation. 
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Finally, Wright asserts that interpreting the participation clause in accordance with the scope 
of the Whistleblower Act will subject employees to adverse action based on its testimony to a 
legislative body or court relating to their job. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 23.) However, the 
Whistleblower Act is not the only protection that public employees enjoy. Rather, such an employee 
could likely assert a cause of action based on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for 
retaliation for speaking on a matter of public concern. See Mallonee, 139 Idaho at 622, 84 P. 3d at 
558. Thus, simply because an employee's action falls outside the scope of the Whistleblower Act 
does not mean that the public employee is completely without any course of redress or civil cause 
of action for other wrongdoings. A variety of other protections under other statutes, constitutional 
provisions, or the common law are available to that employee. The Whistleblower Act only 
represents single cause of action that the Idaho Legislature created solely to protect the integrity of 
government by creating protections for an employee's particular actions that stem from reports waste 
or a violation of a law, rule or regulation. 
In sum, the Whistleblower Act was statutorily created to authorize a specific cause of action 
to target a government entity's wrongful actions implicating waste or violations of a law, rule or 
regulation. This is explicitly stated in the legislative intent codified at Idaho Code§ 6-2101. The 
standards of statutory interpretation require that the whole of the Whistleblower Act be read to give 
effect to that expressly stated intent. Thus, the protections of the Whistleblower Act are only 
triggered by a cause of action that is predicated upon a report of waste or violations of a law, rule or 
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regulation. There is no such claim at issue in this case. Wright's cause of action is solely based on 
allegations of a violation of an internal personnel policy. 
2. The policies in Ada County's handbook cannot form the basis of a cause of action 
under the Whistleblower Act because it does not carry the force and effect of law. 
It is undisputed that the bases of Wright's Whistleblower Act Claim are the investigations 
into complaints relating to violations of Ada County's policy on general harassment. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 32.) To bring his allegations within the scope of the Whistleblower Act, Wright 
contends that Ada County's internal policy is a law, rule or regulation. However, an employer's 
workplace policies that are approved by resolution, do not carry the force and effect of law. 
Therefore, those policies are not the equivalent of a law, rule or regulation and cannot sustain a cause 
of action under the Whistleblower Act. 
Wright contends that the policies at issue were "promulgated under a county ordinance" and 
therefore have the force and effect of a rule or regulation. (Appellant's Opening Brief p. 33.) 
However, Wright mis-characterizes the process that approved the policy at issue and misunderstands 
the significance of what is required for a policy to constitute a rule or regulation. 
This Court has rejected taking an expansive view of what constitutes a violation of a law, rule 
or statute under the terms of the Whistleblower Act. Mallonee, 139 Idaho at 620, 84 P.3d at 555-556. 
The Court has found that the Act only allows for actions resulting from violations of laws or 
violations of rules and regulations that have been properly promulgated by an administrative body 
in a manner giving them the force and effect of law. Id. 
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In Mallonee, the Court upheld a grant of summary judgment and dismissal of a claim under 
the Act because the former employee only reported a violation of an internal policy of a state agency. 
Id. The internal policy had not been promulgated under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and 
therefore the Court determined it did not carry the force and effect of law. Id. Although the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act only applies to state agencies, the significance behind the procedures 
required to promulgate a rule is that, before it is given the effect of law, a proposed rule must 
undergo a period of public comment, public hearing, and review by the legislature. LC. § 67-5201 
et seq. These rules can only be changed by following the same process. Id. Thus, a rule or regulation 
affects the private rights or procedures available to the public. Service Employees Int'! Union Local 
6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 106 Idaho 756,759,683 P.2d 404,407 (1984). 
In contrast, an internal management policy does not affect the private rights or procedures 
available to the public. Id. Additionally, internal management policies can be changed by as 
necessary by an agency head because they do not carry the force and effect of law. Id. Thus, the 
Mallonee court found that the agency's policy that formed the basis of the Whistleblower Act claim 
did not constitute a law, rule or regulation under the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the Mallonee 
court determined that the former employee did not have a cause of action under the Act. Mallonee, 
139 Idaho at 620-621, 84 P.3d at 556-557. Although Ada County is not subject to the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act because it is not a state agency, the same fundamentals principles 
apply in determining whether Ada County's policy carries the force and effect of law. 
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In generaL a county may enact ordinances and adopt resolutions; however a resolution is not 
the legal equivalent of an ordinance. It is a basic principle that"[ c]ounty boards can proceed in the 
exercise of their powers only by means of orders, ordinances, or resolutions. Any action which does 
not rise to the dignity of an ordinance is a resolution, and a county resolution does not have the 
binding effect of an ordinance." 20 C.J.S. Counties§ 145 (2014). Furthermore, Black's Law 
Dictionary (9th ed.) at 1208 defines "ordinance" as "[a]n authoritative law or decree; esp., a 
municipal regulation. Municipal governments can pass ordinances on matters that the state 
government allows to be regulated at the local level. A municipal ordinance carries the state's 
authority and has the same effect within the municipality's limits as a state statute." In contrast, a 
"resolution" is defined as "[a] main motion that formally expresses the sense, will, or action of a 
deliberative assembly." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.) at 1426. Thus, the plain definitions of the 
terms differentiate between an ordinance that has the effect of a law and a resolution that is simply 
a formal motion and does not have the effect of a law. 
Similarly, this Court has distinguished a resolution from a law, noting that a resolution is not 
a law. Wasden ex rel. State v. Idaho State Bd a/Land Com'rs, 150 Idaho 547,556 (2010) (citing 
Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567(1910)). In Balderston, the Court also noted that a resolution "is 
not enacted in the manner provided for the enactment of a law ... and it is not contended that it is a 
law." 17 Idaho at 577. Hence, ordinances are legally binding and have the force and effect of law, 
but resolutions do not have the force and effect of law. 
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In this case, the need for a handbook outlining Ada County's policies was initially 
contemplated by an Ada County ordinance that repealed the County's previous classified 
employment system and enacted an at-will system of personnel administration. (R. 233-234.) The 
repeal of the classified system and enactment of the at-will system was originally to be effective 
March 1, 2007. (Id.) On February 20, 2007, Ada County amended the ordinance to change the 
effective date of the at-will system to June 1, 2007. (R. 235-236.) The ordinance also anticipated that 
"handbooks" providing the human resource policies and procedures would be adopted by resolution 
on June I, 2007. (Id.) The ordinance states that: 
In the interim period prior to the effective date of the new personnel system, the Ada County 
Department of Administrative Services shall prepare a draft handbook for review by the 
Board of Ada County Commissioners. This handbook will be an overall guide to the County 
personnel system. The handbook shall be adopted by resolution of the Board of County 
Commissioners. It may be amended from time to time by the Board of County 
Commissioners for such reasons as they may determine. 
(Id. ( emphasis added)) Additionally, the ordinance discussed "further procedural guidelines" to be 
created by an internal department of Ada County, stating: 
Prior to the effective date of this Ordinance further procedural guidelines shall be 
promulgated by the Ada County Department of Administrative Services and circulated to 
each elected official for comment. The Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook 
shall provide a guide for supervisors, department heads and elected officials in the 
implementation of the Ada County Employment Handbook. On or after June I, 2007, such 
Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook, amended, as the Board of County 
Commissioners shall deem appropriate, shall be adopted by resolution. The Human 
Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook may be amended from time to time by resolution 
of the Board of Ada County Commissioners. 
(R. 236 (emphasis added).) Thus, the ordinance that Wright claims gives the policies the force and 
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effect of law simply directs the County staff to prepare a handbook to provide guidelines for 
employees and managers to follow in implementing the at-will system of personnel administration. 
The ordinance specifically directs that any such handbook will be adopted only by resolution and 
may be amended simply by the direction of the Board. 
The general harassment policy that forms the basis of Wright's Whistleblower Claim in this 
case is included in Ada County's employee handbook. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 32.) The Board 
of Ada County Commissioners initially approved the handbook by resolution on May 30, 2007. (R. 
231, 237.) The handbook was not adopted by an ordinance. (R. 232.) Since May 30, 2007, the 
handbook has only been amended by motion by the Board of Ada County Commissioners. (Id.) The 
handbook only affects the internal management of Ada County and its implementation of its at-will 
system of personnel administration. (R. 237.) 
Thus, the Ada County personnel policy at issue simply does not carry any of the indicia of 
a law, rule or regulation that carries the force and effect of law. The policy is used for internal 
management purposes of Ada County and does not affect any private rights of the general public. 
It was initially approved only through resolution and has been amended only by motion of the Board. 
Moreover, the handbook can be changed by the Board of Ada County Commissioners whenever they 
deem necessary. Thus, the policy at issue does not carry the force and effect of law, and therefore 
cannot constitute a law, rule or regulation within the meaning of the Whistleblower Act. 
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Therefore, Wright's claim that he experienced an adverse employment action based on his 
participation in investigations into potential violations of Ada County's general harassment policy 
does not fall within the protections of the Whistleblower Act; Wright does not have a claim under 
the Whistleblower Act. Thus, the District Court properly granted summary judgment and dismissed 
the Whistle blower Act Claim. This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment on appeal. 
3. Wright did not plead a cause of action related to waste and the investigation(s) at issue 
did not stem from a report of waste. 
Wright attempts to revive his Whistleblower Act Claim by contending that one of the 
investigations had an incidental finding of waste. However, Wright never pled a cause of action 
based on a report of waste and Wright's claimed protected activity was not related to any report of 
waste. Ultimately, Wright's argument fails because the Court cannot consider an argument that was 
never raised in the pleadings and because any implication of alleged waste was merely incidental to 
any claimed protected activity. 
a. Governmental waste is not at issue in this case. 
If the District Court erred in its discussion of the Whistleblower claim, then its error was in 
even mentioning Wright's argument regarding waste on reconsideration. "A cause of action not 
raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered 
for the first time on appeal.'' Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178, 75 P.3d 
733, 739 (2003). A pleading must directly state a cause of action or at least allege specific factual 
allegations sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claim alleged against it. Id. As Ada 
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County noted in its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Wright 
never pled a cause of action based on the reporting of or investigation into waste. (R. 397-398.) 
Here, the Amended Complaint only alleged the Whistleblower Act Claim in terms of 
protected activity related to the "investigation into complaints of harassment," "the investigation 
resulted in a determination that harassment had occurred" and the "termination of Plaintiff's 
employment because he initiated, coordinated, facilitated, and provided necessary information during 
the investigation of an Ada County employee accused of harassment, and/ or investigation of claims 
of hostile work environment." (R. 50-51, 53-54.) Further, Wright only presented the complaints of 
harassment and hostile work environment as potential violations of Ada County policy. (R. 203 
("Plaintiff brought this action alleging he was terminated for his role in the investigations of policy 
violations by certain employees at Ada County.")) Thus, the Amended Complaint failed to give Ada 
County any notice that Wright was pleading a cause of action based on allegations of waste rather 
than only on allegations of a violation of Ada County policy relating to harassment. 
A cause of action under the Whistleblower Act based on waste raises different issues of fact 
and different questions oflaw involving whether Wright's activities related in any way to a reporting 
of waste and what constitutes "government waste." Thus, a cause of action under the Whistleblower 
Act based on allegations of waste is materially different from a cause of action under the Act based 
on allegations of a violation of a harassment policy. Consequently, the Amended Complaint did not 
raise a cause of action based on allegations of governmental waste and such allegations were 
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improperly raised at summary judgment and similarly cannot be considered on appeal. 
b. After-the-fact incidental implications of waste are insufficient to support a cause of 
action under the Whistleblower Act. 
As discussed the Whistleblower Act creates a specific cause of action" for public employees 
who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of 
a law, rule or regulation." I. C. § 6-2101 (emphasis added); Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & 
Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,395,224 P.3d 458,462 (2008) (citing to I. C. § 6-2101). Accordingly, it 
protects certain activities of employees that stem from a report of waste. 
There is no dispute that the investigations that form the basis of the Amended Complaint 
were initiated by and into allegations of a violations of Ada County's general harassment policy. 
There was no report of waste. Thus, Wright's activities that he claims whistleblower protection for 
were not prompted by any report, communication or investigation of waste. The tangential items that 
Wright alleges are wasteful were all raised after-the-fact by the investigator in his report. (R. 206, 
388-389.) As the District Court aptly summarized, "[e]ven if Mr. Wright's involvement in the 
investigations may have resulted in uncovering incidental use of county time or facilities to say 
unkind things about fellow employees, his conduct did not rise to the level of protected 'reporting 
[of] waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation' or to the level of any protected conduct 
enumerated in the act. I. C. Sections 6-2101, 6-2104." (R. 443-444.) Therefore, the District Court 
properly found that Wright's allegations that form the basis of the Amended Complaint did not fall 
within the protections of the Whistleblower Act and affirmed its grant of summary judgment. 
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Notably, the District Court did not find that the concerns noted in the investigator's report 
actually constituted waste within the meaning of the Whistleblower Act. Wright argues that they 
constitute waste by attempting to draw a parallel to conduct complained of in Curlee. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 32). However, whether Curlee' s co-workers' use of time constituted waste was not 
an issue on appeal in that case, and there was no judicial inquiry into whether there was waste. The 
fact that Wright must attempt to argue these points on appeal further shows that a cause of action 
based on allegations of waste raises different questions of fact and law than the ones raised by 
Wright in his Amended Complaint. Such issues were not proper for consideration in the case at hand. 
Ultimately, the Whistleblower Act protects specific activities of an employee initiated by a 
report of waste, not someone else's later concerns about activities that Wright contends are wasteful. 
Nothing offered by Wright below or on appeal changes the plain facts or law that Wright did not 
participate in an investigation into any report of a waste or a violation of a law, rule, or regulation; 
therefore, Wright's allegations do not state a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act. The grant 
of summary judgment dismissing Wright's Whistleblower Act Claim should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court properly granted summary judgment on the FMLA claim because 
Wright failed to present sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of interference and no 
iury could have found that Ada County's termination was related to the FMLA. 
The District Court determined that Ada County was entitled to summary judgment on 
Wright's FMLA claim because "there [was] no evidence of any interference with or causal 
connection between Mr. Wright's request for an FMLA benefit and the decision to discharge him." 
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(R. 308.) Thus, the District Court properly concluded that the "undisputed evidence shows that [the 
decision to terminate and the request for FMLA leave] were unrelated." (Id.) The District Court 
refused to reconsider its decision on the FMLA claim because Wright only reargued the same 
position and did not offer anything new to show the court's decision was incorrect. (R. 444.) 
On appeal, Wright encompasses two independent arguments into his brief. First, regarding 
his prima facie case, Wright argues that he was denied benefits under the FMLA because he should 
have been entitled to additional FMLA leave after the termination of his employment and "there is 
no evidence in the record that Wright's need for FMLA leave would have ceased after thirty days." 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34.) However, this argument is founded on the incorrect premise that 
re-certification of FMLA leave is automatic. Second, Wright argues without legal authority that Ada 
County can be held liable under the FMLA for a violation of the Whistleblower Act. 
It must be noted that Footnote 2 of Appellant's Opening Brief (p. 36) states that "Ada County 
has only asserted that it is entitled to summary judgment because Wright cannot establish that Ada 
County's decision to terminate his employment was related to his FMLA leave. This is blatantly 
incorrect. Ada County thoroughly argued in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the FMLA claim 
failed not only because Wright could not establish a prima facie case of interference as he could not 
show he was entitled to and denied of benefits under the FMLA (R. 174-178) but also because Ada 
County established that Wright's termination was unrelated to his request for FMLA leave (R. 
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178-1801). (R. 180.) Ada County also advanced these two independent bases on reconsideration. (R. 
405-409.) These are two separate fatal flaws to Wright's argument; and as argued by Ada County 
in the proceeding below, they each independently justified dismissal of Wright's FMLA claim. 
1. Wright was not entitled to additional FMLA leave after he was terminated. 
In order to present a prima facie case of interference under the FMLA, Wright must show in 
part that (1) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, and (2) his employer denied him FMLA 
benefits to which he was entitled. Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F. 3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2006); 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 36). As Ada County argued below, the evidence in the record showed 
that Wright received all the benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA, and Wright did not 
produce any evidence that he was actually entitled to benefits he did not receive. 
The FMLA only creates two substantive benefits for employees: period(s) of requested leave, 
and upon returning from approved leave, reinstatement to his position or equivalent position. 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a). Wright has not appreciably argued on appeal that he that he was entitled 
to reinstatement; only FMLA leave is at issue. The FMLA allows an employee to take up to a total 
of twelve weeks of leave during a twelve month period for his serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(l). An employee must request a period of FMLA leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). The 
FMLA allows an employer to require that the employee's request be supported by a certification 
1 Ada County argued a third basis for dismissal of the FMLA claim based on the standard 
in 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c), which prohibits an employer's consideration of the use ofFMLA 
leave as a negative factor in termination. It does not appear that the District Court relied on this 
argument or that Wright alleged that his request for FMLA leave was a factor in his termination. 
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issued by the health care provider. Id. A certification for intermittent leave must indicate the 
"probable duration" of the health condition, and duration of the intermittent leave or reduced leave 
schedule. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b). 
The material facts at issue supported by the evidence showed that Wright submitted an 
application for FMLA leave prior to his termination. (R. 153.) Wright's application required a 
certification from his medical provider before his request could be considered. (Id.) The 
"Certification of Health Care Provider" filled out by Wright's medical provider approximated 
Wright's time period of incapacity as December 2010 through February 2013. (R. 150-151.) After 
receiving the certification, Wright was deemed as qualifying for intermittent FMLA leave for the 
time period of December 20, 2012 through February 28, 2013. (R. 149.) Despite the fact that 
Wright's FMLA was not processed until after his termination, Ada County extended Wright's pay 
and benefits through the month of February to cover what would have been Wright's requested 
FMLA leave. (R. 148.) Thus, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that Wright received all the 
benefits that he had applied for and was entitled to under the FMLA. 
However, Wright contends that he was entitled to additional FMLA leave beyond February 
2013 because "there is no evidence in the record that Wright's need for FMLA leave would have 
ceased after thirty days" and Wright believes that he would have been re-certified for additional 
FMLA leave through the re-certification process. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 37.) This argument 
is fundamentally flawed on a number of basis. 
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First, FMLA only applies to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.216. Thus, 
when an employee is terminated he is not entitled to additional benefits under the FMLA. See 29 
C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(] )("If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave and 
employment is terminated, the employer's responsibility to continue FMLA leave, maintain group 
health plan benefits and restore the employee cease at the time the employee is laid off, provided the 
employer has no continuing obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise."); 
llhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Here, it was undisputed that Wright was no longer an employee of Ada County after his 
termination on January 15, 2013. (R.147-148.) Wright received all of his salary and benefits through 
the end of February 2013. (See id.) Thus, the additional leave that Wright claims he was entitled to 
would have been after February 2013. Hence, at the time that Wright claims he would have requested 
re-certification for additional FMLA leave, Wright was no longer an employee and not entitled to 
FMLA leave from Ada County. Thus as a matter of law, Wright was not entitled to FMLA leave in 
March 2013 or anytime after his termination. As such, Wright cannot establish a prima facie case 
of interference with his benefits under the FMLA. 
Second, Wright essentially contends that his application for FMLA leave entitled him to 
twelve weeks of intermittent FMLA leave over an indefinite period of time; this is legally and 
factually false. Under the FMLA regulations, intermittent leave simply refers to circumstances when 
an employee takes FMLA leave "in separate blocks of time due to a single qualifying reason," such 
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as for treatments for a serious medical condition. 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a). Thus, an employee on 
intermittent FMLA leave will regularly be in the office but take off a certain number of hours during 
a day, week or month for his treatments. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(b). An employee's hours taken off 
for intermittent leave will be calculated and counted against the employee's total allowable 12 
workweeks of FMLA leave for the year. Id. 
Wright's intermittent FMLA leave was designated for the finite period of time from 
December 20, 2012 through February 28, 2013. (R. 149.) Wright's designated FMLA leave was for 
two one-hour appointments each month for those two months. (R. 150-151.) Wright's certified and 
designated FMLA leave for these appointments did not extend past February 20, 2013. (R. 149.) To 
be certified and designated for an additional period of intermittent FMLA leave, Wright would have 
been required to follow Ada County's procedures for requesting leave, including submitting another 
request and proving he was an eligible employee with a qualifying medical condition necessitating 
leave from work. This would have required a new certification from his health care provider. (MSJ 
Hr'g Tr. 23, November 7, 2014.) At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, opposing 
counsel admitted that Wright's medical provider had not provided or submitted to Ada County a new 
medical certification and Wright never applied for additional FMLA leave. (Jd.) Thus, even if Wright 
had remained an employee, an additional period intermittent FMLA leave after February 2013 was 
not legally or factually presumed or automatic. 
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Thus, Wright's claimed absence of evidence that his serious medical condition ceased does 
not affirmatively establish the prima facie element of an interference claim that Wright had met all 
the requirements under the laws and procedures of the FMLA for an additional period of leave. 
Speculations on what could have, what should have, or would have occurred if Wright had remained 
employed with Ada County are insufficient to support a finding that Wright was actually entitled to 
additional benefits under the FMLA. Quite simply, whether Wright would have been eligible for 
additional FMLA leave if he applied for leave does not mean that he was entitled to FMLA leave. 
Wright's burden is to present sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie case that he was entitled 
to benefits and denied those benefits. Thus, the evidence in the record does not support a prima facie 
case of interference under the FMLA, and summary judgement on the FMLA claim was proper. 
In summary, Wright was not entitled to benefits under the FMLA after February 2013 
because he was no longer an employee, and Wright would have been required to take additional steps 
to demonstrate his eligibility for additional FMLA leave. However, it is ultimately not necessary for 
this Court to determine that Wright failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
case of interference under the FMLA because Ada County also conclusively established its defense 
to the FMLA claim by demonstrating that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Ada 
County's termination decision was unrelated to Wright's request for FMLA leave. 
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2. The District Court did not err in finding that the undisputed evidence showed that 
Wright's termination was unrelated to the FMLA. 
Even if Wright could support a prima facie case of interference under the FMLA, Ada County 
conclusively demonstrated a complete defense to the FMLA claim because Ada County's reasons 
for terminating Wright were unrelated to the FMLA. Further, Wright's contention that a violation 
of the Idaho Whistleblower Act can establish liability under the FMLA is unsupport by the plain 
language of the FMLA and case law. Rather, the law overwhelmingly states that an employer who 
terminates an employee for reasons that are unrelated to the FMLA is not liable for a violation of the 
FMLA. Thus, the District Court properly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material 
fact that Ada County's reasons for terminating Wright were unrelated to the FMLA, and its grant of 
summary judgment was appropriate. 
a. An employer is not liable under the FMLA when its termination of an employee is 
unrelated to the FMLA. 
Wright asserts that a violation of an unrelated state law can establish liability under a federal 
law, the FMLA, because the termination of employment would not be "legitimate." (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 36.) It appears this argument relies on parsing a legitimate reason from a non-
FMLA related reason. (Id.) Wright offers no legal authority in the FMLA or in case law to support 
this argument. Instead, the law is uniform and unambiguous that an employer who terminates an 
employee for reasons unrelated to the FMLA is not liable for interference under the FMLA. 
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An employer's defense to an FMLA claim is rooted in the plain language of the FMLA, 
which states: "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to ... any 
right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit or position to which the 
employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave." 29 U.S.C. § 
2614(a)(3)(B). Thus, there are limitations to an employee's entitlement to rights secured by the 
FMLA. Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778-779 (9th Cir.2011 ). Accordingly, the employer can defend against 
an FMLA by asserting one of these limitations. Id. at 779. 
One limitation is when an employee would have been terminated "regardless of the 
employee's request for, or taking of, leave." Id. at 780 (quoting Smith v. D(ffee 
Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955,963 (10th Cir.2002) and also citing Strickland v. Water 
Works & Sewer Bd. of Binningham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir.2001) and Throneberry v. 
McGehee Desha County Hmp., 403 F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir.2005)). In Sanders, the Ninth Circuit 
referred to this as a "legitimate reason." Id. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Throneberry found that 
"[a]s long as an employer can show a lawful reason, i.e., a reason unrelated to an employee's 
exercise of FMLA rights, for not restoring an employee on FMLA leave to her position, the employer 
will be justified to interfere with an employee's FMLA leave rights." 403 F.3d at 979. Thus, a wealth 
of case law from differing circuits has found that an employer has a defense to an FMLA when it 
shows that its reasons for termination were unrelated to the FMLA. 
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This is further reinforced by the FMLA regulations themselves. For instance 29 C.F.R. § 
825.220 discusses the protections for employees who request leave under the FMLA, and states: 
The FMLA prohibits interference with an employee's rights under the law, and with 
legal proceedings or inquiries relating to an employee's rights. More specifically, the 
law contains the following employee protections: 
(I) An employer is prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying 
the exercise of ( or attempts to exercise) any rights provided by the Act. 
(2) An employer is prohibited from discharging or in any other way 
discriminating against any person (whether or not an employee) for opposing or 
complaining about any unlawful practice under the Act. 
(3) All persons (whether or not employers) are prohibited from discharging 
or in any other way discriminating against any person (whether or not an employee) 
because that person has-
(i) Filed any charge, or has instituted (or caused to be instituted) any 
proceeding under or related to this Act; 
(ii) Given, or is about to give, any information in connection with an inquiry 
or proceeding relating to a right under this Act; 
(iii) Testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to 
a right under this Act. 
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)(emphasis added). Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) begins "[a]ny violations 
of the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of 
rights provided by the Act." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the plain language of the FMLA regulations 
only discusses liability under the FMLA in terms of violations of the FMLA. There is nothing in the 
language of the FMLA regulations to support the assertion that conduct unrelated to the FMLA can 
constitute a violation of the FMLA, even if that conduct violates a state law. 
Finally, as the Sanders court noted, the Ninth Circuit in Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 
486 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2007), denied a plaintiff's appeal of her interference claim "alleging that the 
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jury instructions misstated the law regarding which party had the burden of proving whether the 
employer would have terminated the employee had the employee not taken FMLA leave." 657 F.3d 
at 779. However, the court did not decide the issue because any error in the jury instruction was 
harmless "because the defendant offered 'uncontradicted evidence that [the employer] terminated 
Gambini for conduct unrelated to her FMLA leave."' Id. ( quoting Ganibini, 486 F.3d at 1091). 
Notably, in Gambini, the court did remand the plaintiff's claim that her termination violated a state 
law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability; although the issues on appeal did not argue 
that a violation of the state law claim constituted a violation of the FMLA. 486 F.3d at 1091. 
In all, the plain language of the FMLA laws and regulations and the case law support the 
conclusion that as a matter of law, an employer has a complete defense to an interference claim when 
it establishes that its reasons for terminating an employee were unrelated to the FMLA. 
b. No reasonable jury could find that Wright's termination was related to the FMLA. 
Although Wright asserts that Ada County's reason for termination is a question of fact for 
the jury, the District Court properly granted summary judgment because the evidence in the record 
conclusively showed that Wright's termination was unrelated to the FMLA. Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Accordingly, 
summary judgment should be granted when reasonable people could not reach differing conclusions 
or inferences from the evidence before the court. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp .. 141 Idaho 233, 
238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). 
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As the District Court noted, in this case, there was no evidence of a connection between 
Wright's request for FMLA leave and his termination by Ada County. (R. 308.) Rather, the District 
Court properly noted that "undisputed evidence" showed that Wright's FMLA ]eave request was 
unrelated to his termination (id.) because none of the Ada County Commissioners were even aware 
of Wright's illness or FMLA application when the decision to terminate Wright was made (R. 92, 
ll3-114, 133-134, 136, 140). On appeal Wright does not point to anything in the record that sheds 
doubt or raises an inference that Wright's illness or request for FMLA leave somehow Jed to his 
termination. To the contrary, Wright only contends that his termination was related to conduct 
protected by the Idaho Whist]eblower Act. 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment on the FMLA claim was proper because 
Ada County satisfied its burden to show that its termination of Wright was unrelated to his FMLA 
application. Accordingly, there was nothing in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
In aJI, this Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing 
Wright's FMLA claim because the undisputed evidence showed that Ada County's decision to 
terminate Wright's employment was unrelated to Wright's request for FMLA leave, or in the 
alternative, because Wright failed to establish his prima facie case as he cannot raise a genuine issue 
of material fact that he was entitled to any leave under the FMLA that he was denied. 
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Wright's Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim was properly dismissed 
because the Whistleblower Act was not intended to prevent emotional harm. 
It is undisputed that Wright's claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is solely 
dependent on its Whistleblower Act claim.2 Wright relies on the Whistleblower Act to establish a 
necessary element of his prima facie case that Ada County owed a duty to Wright. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 38.) As demonstrated, the Whistleblower Act claim fails; thus, the Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim also fails. Even if the Whistleblower Act claim had survived, 
the Whistleblower Act cannot be used to support a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim 
because the statute was not intended to prevent emotional distress. 
In order to use a statutory duty created by the Whistleblower Act to support Wright's 
negligence claim, "the following elements must be met: ( 1) the statute [] must clearly define the 
required standard of conduct; (2) the statute [] must have been intended to prevent the type of harm 
the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons 
the statute [] was designed to protect; and ( 4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of 
the injury. Nation v. State Dep't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 190, 158 P.3d 953,966 (2006) (emphasis 
added). In this case, the Whistleblower Act was not intended to prevent an employee's emotional 
distress. This is unequivocally found in the stated intent of the Act as well as the specific remedies 
2 Wright's heading for Section C implied that Wright was also appealing the dismissal of 
the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (IlED). However, Wright does not address 
IIED in his argument, and therefore it cannot be considered by the Court. Bach v. Bagley, 148 
Idaho 784,790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). 
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available for a violation of the Act. 
The intent of the Act is to benefit "the citizens of this state to protect the integrity of 
government" and thererfore authorizes a cause of action for employees who report the government's 
waste or violation of a law, rule or regulation. I.C. § 6-2101. Thus, the harm that the Act intends to 
prevent is the harm to citizens of Idaho and the integrity of their government, which is comprised 
when the government wastes the resources of the people and violates its laws. To that end, it creates 
a cause of action for employees who are in a position to report and uncover such transgressions. 
This emphasis on protecting the integrity of the government is further supported by the 
limited and enumerated remedies provided for in the Act. Wright contends that the list of remedies 
contained in Idaho Code § 6-2106 are not the exclusive remedies that a court may order for a 
violation of the Act. (Appellant's Brief, p. 39.) That provision states that: 
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or all of the 
following: 
(l) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act; 
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the adverse action, 
or to an equivalent position; 
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 
( 4) The compensation for lost wages. benefits and other remuneration; 
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees; 
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), which shall 
be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general fund. 
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§ 6-2106 (emphasis added). Thus, the Act specifies the express and specific remedies that may 
be awarded; it does not provide for any other type of relief. 
Wright emphasizes the permissive term "may" in the statute. (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 
38.) However, this grant of discretion to the court in determining which of the available remedies 
may be appropriate for the applicable violation of the Act does not support the contention that a court 
then may also disregard this statute and award any other remedy that a plaintiff may request. 
Wright contends that this broader authority is found in Idaho Code§ 6-2105, which generally 
defines damages and provides that "[ a ]n employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring 
a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both ... " LC. § 6-2105(2). 
Although, Wright contends that statutory construction requires this Court to construe this provision 
with independent meaning, Wright ignores "a basic tenet of statutory construction that the more 
specific statute or section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general." 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't ()_f Health and We(fare, 147 Idaho 257, 264, 207 P.3d 988, 995 (2009). 
Accordingly, the general statements regarding remedies contained in Idaho Code § 6-2105 are 
controlled by the specific types of remedies that are enumerated in Idaho Code § 6-2106. 
Furthermore, another recognized rule of statutory construction is the maxim of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, that where a statute "specifies certain things, the designation of such 
things excludes all others." KGF Developnient, LLC v. City()_{ Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 528, 236 
P.3d 1284, 1288 (2010). Here, Idaho Code§ 6-2106 contains an enumerated list of the remedies the 
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court may order in rendering judgment. Non-economic damages are not included in that list. 
Consequently, non-economic damages are excluded from the remedies that can be awarded under 
the Act. Thus, the absence of any non-economic damages from the types of remedies available under 
the Whistleblower Act shows that the Act was not intended to prevent emotional harm. 
Furthermore, the damages that the court may order includes the assessment of a civil fine 
against the government employer, which is paid to the general fund of the state. An employee 
receives no compensation from this fine. Thus, the types of relief that a court may award is not 
limited to compensation of the employee bringing the action. 
In all, the expressly stated intent and the enumerated remedies available under the Act 
demonstrate that the Whistleblower Act was intended to prevent the harm done to the integrity of 
government from waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation. It was not intended to prevent the 
infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the Whistleblower Act cannot be used as the basis for a 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim. The grant of summary of judgment on the 
emotional distress claim was proper, first because the Whistleblower Act Claim fails, and second, 
because the Whistleblower Act does not establish a duty that can be used to sustain a Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim. Thus, this Court should affirm the dismissal of the claim. 
E. The District Court erred in failing to award Ada County any of its attorney's fees. 
Ada County cross-appeals the sole issue regarding the denial of its attorney fees for its 
successful defense of the Whistleblower Act Claim and emotional distress claims as a matter oflaw 
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on summary judgment. Although the District Court properly found Ada County was the prevailing 
party, it failed to discuss the legal standards applicable to the specific statutes before it. 
A denial of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hymas v. Meridian Police 
Dep't,156 Idaho 739,330 P.3d 1097 (Ct. App. 2014). On appeal, the lower court's decision will be 
examined to determine whether it (I) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards to the 
particular choices before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
The District Court dismissed all of Wright's claims almost exclusively based on questions 
of law. Regarding the relevant claims to Ada County's request for attorney fees, the Whistleblower 
Act claim was dismissed because Wright's conduct did not fall within the explicitly stated intent of 
the Act, and the provisions of the Act that Wright relied on were necessarily and logically limited 
by that codified legislative intent. (R. 444.) The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was 
dismissed for the same reason, and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim because 
there was "no evidence to suggest that the behavior was extreme or outrageous and beyond all 
possible bounds of decency." (R. 310-311.) 
After the District Court granted Ada County's Motion for Summary on all claims, Ada 
County requested its costs and attorney's fees on the Whistleblower Act claim and emotional distress 
claims under the clear statutory bases for an award of attorney fees to Ada County for those claims. 
(R. 317-318.) Ada County requested its fees under Whistleblower Act pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
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2107, which specifically allows that "attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if 
the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is without basis in law 
or in fact." Similarly, Idaho Code § 12-117 requires an award of attorney's fees when the opposing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
This Court has consistently determined that when a party advances arguments in disregard 
to the plain language of a statute that party has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
Arnold, 158 Idaho 218,345 P.3d at 1013-1014 (2015); Jayo Development, 345 P.3d at 213 (Idaho 
2015)(citing to Idaho Wool Grmvers Ass 'n, 154 Idaho at 724,302 P.3d at 349 (2012); Fischer, 14 lat 
356, 109 P.3d at 1098). Further, the fact that an issue is a matter of first impression does not act as 
a bar to an award of attorney fees. Arnold, 345 P.3d at 1014. Rather, despite the fact that an appellate 
court has not previously decided the issue, when the statutory language is clear enough to contradict 
the argument at issue, an award of attorney's fees is still warranted. Id. 
Accordingly, Ada County requested its attorney's fees because Wright's arguments were in 
direct contradiction to the plainly stated legislative intent in the Whistleblower Act, he attempts to 
take one provision of the Act out of context, and he advances an absurd interpretation of the statute; 
these are contrary to the well-established principles of statutory interpretation. Thus, Wright's claims 
lacked a basis in law or in fact and Ada County requested its attorney's fees. 
In the alternative to a full grant of attorney fees, Ada County requested its attorney's fees 
incurred after filing its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 321-323.) The Whistleblower Act's 
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attorney's fee statute contains a specific provision that allows a claimant to avoid liability for the 
employer's attorney's fees "if after exercising reasonable and diligent efforts after filing a suit the 
employee files a voluntary dismissal concerning the employer within a reasonable time after 
determining that the employer would not be liable for damages." LC. § 6-2107 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, Ada County asserted that at the very latest, after considering Ada County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Wright should have known that its claims were outside the scope of the 
Whistle blower Act. Thus, Wright should have determined that Ada County would not be liable under 
the Whistleblower Act. Consequently, Wright also could not support a prima facie case for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. When Wright proceeded with his arguments and the litigation 
process without a basis in law or fact, Wright lost the safe harbor for liability for attorney's fees 
granted under the Whistle blower Act. Thus, Wright's actions after the filing of Ada County's Motion 
for Summary Judgment increasingly lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact. Hence, Ada County 
requested an alternative award of its fees after that time. 
The District Court's analysis of the Whistleblower Act's attorney's fees statute summarily 
stated "[w]hile the court disagreed with Mr. Wright's theory of the case, his arguments were not so 
unreasonable as to require the court to impose an award of attorney's fees, especially since some of 
the issues have not been definitively decided by an appellate court." (R. 451 (citations omitted).) 
Regarding the emotional distress claims, the District Court first recognized that under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117 an award of attorney's fees is mandatory when the opposing party acts without a reasonable 
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basis in law or fact; yet District Court's "analysis" consisted of simply concluding "[t]he court does 
not find that the alternative emotional distress claims were alleged so frivolously or so without 
foundation as to warrant an award of attorney's fees." (R. 451-452.) 
The District Court's analysis failed to even discuss the specific prov1s10ns of the 
Whistle blower Act's provision for attorney's fees and the choices before it to award even a partial 
grant of attorney's fees once the futility of Wright's argument was apparent under what the District 
Court described as the "necessary and logical" application of the clearly stated legislative intent of 
the [Whistleblower] Act. Further, the District Court erred in failing to consider attorney's fees simply 
because the issue had not previously been "definitely decided" by an appellate court despite that this 
Court's jurisprudence has determined that attorney's fees may be awarded even on an issue of first 
impression when the non-prevailing party has acted contrary to plain statutory language. 
Hence, the District Court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards to the 
particular choices before it. Consequently, the District Court abused its discretion in its denial of Ada 
County's request for its attorney's fees either in whole or in part. Thus, the denial of attorney's fees 
in the proceeding below should be reversed and remanded. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment on all issues on direct appeal, and on cross-appeal, this Court should reverse the District 
Court's denial of Ada County's attorney's fees. Also, this Court should award, in whole or in part, 
the Respondent-Cross-Appellant Ada County its attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho 
Code §§ 6-2107 and 12-117 where Appellant's arguments have no reasonable basis in law or fact. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 2015. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
espondent, Cross-
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